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''Batty Mac'' 
Portrait of a Brigade Cornrnander of 
the Great War, 1915-1917 
Ian McCulloch 
The Brigade has always been a source of pride and joy to me, and when sorrow came into 
my life, and my only son was killed in action. it was the Brigade that saved me- pulled me 
through and comforted me .... When we first mobilized at Mont de Cats, my job was to weld 
four of the finest battalions Canada sent to the war into a real Brigade- a military Machine 
that would run smoothly and well. Above all, I was anxious that the Brigade be a military 
family. we would all love and be proud of. 1 
Major-General A. C. "Batty Mac" Macdonell's 
undelivered Farewell Address to 7th CIB, 9 June 1917. 
S ir Archibald Cameron Macdonell, KCB, CMG, DSO, the first commander of 7th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade [CIB] was unique, a throwback 
to the Highland chieftains of yore, known politely 
amongst his peers and the officer corps as 
"Fighting Mac." The rank and file simply referred 
to him as "Batty Mac." G .R. Stevens, who served 
as a private in the Princess Patricia's Canadian 
Light Infantry [PPCLI] and was eventually 
commissioned in the regiment during the First 
World War, remembered Macdonell's forward 
style of command from the outset. 
"Batty Mac, our brigade commander, was 
crazy as a coot in many ways," he recalled. "I 
saw him actually get wounded one day. He was 
wearing ... square-pushing jodphurs ... bright 
white .... Somebody said 'Be careful, sir, there's a 
sniper' and he said 'Fuck the sniper,' climbed up 
to get a look and the sniper took him through 
the shoulder and he went ass over applecarts into 
his shellhole from which he had emerged .... My 
god, his language! You could hear him for miles 
around!"2 The furious Macdonell got out of the 
shellhole and went back to retrieve his walking 
stick, whereupon another bullet passed through 
his left arm breaking the bone. Another officer 
who witnessed the episode recorded that "there 
is no doubt he would have been killed but for 
the fact the German sniper was so excited 
shooting at a General that he couldn't aim 
straight!":3 
Brigadier-General Macdonell was perhaps 
one of the most eccentric, indomitable and 
beloved officers to have commanded troops in 
the First World War. Corporal Will Bird of the 
42nd Battalion remembered his brigade 
commander riding up to say farewell at Chateau 
de la Haie: "Everyone had a good word for him 
and stories of his decisions and actions were 
legion." But when it came time for Macdonell to 
speak, "the old fire-eater seemed overcome with 
emotion ... put his horse to the gallop and left 
without saying a word."4 Stevens described him 
in A City Goes to War, the Regimental history of 
the 49th Battalion, as an officer of"a breed whose 
passing has left this world a poorer place -
colourful, fearless, flamboyant in language, canny 
in battle, unabashedly sentimental and emotional 
over his men, who in turn regarded him with joy 
and pride; they treasured his eccentricities, they 
boasted (yes, and lied) concerning his highly 
individual behaviour. "5 
Macdonell started his military career by 
attending Royal Military College [RMC] where he 
excelled at games. At the end of his course at the 
College, his report from the examiner in Civil 
Engineering was, contrary to many academic 
reports, an accurate prediction. It read: "A man 
of marked ability who ought to rise rapidly in 
his profession and be an acquisition to any staff, 
on account of his high personal qualities. "6 On 
29 June 1886, Macdonell graduated and was 
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awarded a commission in the Royal Artillery of 
the British Army. Due to financial difficulties in 
his family, he was unable to accept. but at once 
joined the Canadian Militia as a subaltern. Two 
years later, on 6 April 1888, he became a 
lieutenant in the Canadian Mounted Infantry of 
the Permanent Force (PF). The following year, 
however, saw him transfer into the Royal 
Northwest Mounted Police (RNWMP) in which he 
had a distinguished career for the next 18 years, 
counting service time in South Africa. 
Macdonell went to South Africa as a 
squadron commander in Lord Strathcona's 
Horse, winning a DSO and several mentions in 
dispatches before being severely wounded and 
subsequently evacuated back to Canada for a 
lengthy convalescence. Eager to get back, 
however, he was given command of the newly-
formed 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles only to 
arrive in Cape Town a few days after hostilities 
had ceased. On return to Canada, Macdonell went 
12 
Above left: RMC Class of 1886- top. l. -r.: Kirkpatrick, 
Worseley, Roe, Coutlee, Yorston, Macdonell. 
Newcombe; middle: Maxwell. Henseley. Perry, 
Sloggett, Kennedy, Carrington-Smith: front: 
Cartwright, McColl, Newman, Girouard. · 
Above: Enlargement of Cadet Macdonell. 
Left: Major A. C. Macdonell, Canadian Mounted Rjjies. 
(Photos .from A.C. Macdonell Papers. 
NAC Cl45101 & Cl45102) 
back to the RNWMP but later transferred to Lord 
Strathcona's Horse. He was the regiment's 
commanding officer at the outset ofwar. 7 
An intelligent and worldly-wise man, 
Macdonell predicted in a letter dated 5 August 
1914 to his nephew, Hugh Wallis, that "the war 
is likely to be a long one and many contingents 
\Villlikely go, at least so it looks to me, & I firmly 
believe we shall win in the end, but Germany will 
take a lot of beating indeed." Wallis would become 
his uncle's Orderly Officer [00] in 7th CIB HQ in 
December 1916, but not before joining the 16th 
Battalion at Valcartier as a private, experiencing 
Second Ypres and serving as a platoon 
commander and scout officer with the 13th 
Battalion, CEF, Royal Highlanders of Canada. 
Macdonell's prescient letter to his nephew, 
although unsuccessful in getting his headstrong 
relative to wait before enlisting, offers some 
interesting insights on his immediate prospects 
as a Permanent Force [PF] cavalry officer: 
They seem to be giving the cavalry the go bye 
altogether and I may have to accept an infantry 
command, a thing more or less incompatible to 
me. However in wartime, the unfortunate 
professional soldier must take what he is offered 
one can't hang back. but I am much worried 
over the prospect. Colonel Steele considers that 
(as in the past) all plums will go to the eastern 
wirepullers." 
2
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Macdonell went to the UK with the First 
Contingent, and later France, as the Commanding 
Officer of Lord Strathcona's Horse. After a brief 
stint as acting-commander of the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade, Macdonell's pocket diary 
records on 17 December 1915: "Told officially I 
am to command 7th Infantry Brigade. Gazette to 
follow shortly." More interesting, however, are the 
rough notes in the back of the same diary, 
however, which give his outline credo on how 
commanding officers are to command in his new 
brigade. They read in part: 
Orders -When you receive an order: 
Say what am I wanted to do? When 
am I intended to do it. then finish 
your appreciation. 
lst eliminate self 
Get ambition to do the best for [all].. 
Read your orders carefully and 
say, Would I know what to do, etc. 
Learn to check orders carefully with the map. 
Points for COs Care of men. 
think of them all the time 
How can they be kept dry. fed & spared 
work. etc. shld be second nature 
Discipline Nothing without march 
discipline [illegible] keeps their place. 
Inspection of arms shld be 2nd nature 
Duty of an officer ditto in Infantrymen's 
feet. 
HQs Men & Horses 
In battle habit is everything 
Position of an O.C.'s [sub] units .. 
Make more use of horses and men mtd, etc they 
will help 
tremendously. CO should keep in close 
touch with General.. .. officers 
should never be glued to comd HQs 
but try to anticipate events by being 
forward. Get the habit of frequent 
visits at regular intervals ... " 
The brigade commander refers to "habit" 
twice in his notes, stating that "in battle, habit is 
everything." What does he mean? Macdonell, a 
veteran soldier, knew that battle was a chaotic 
affair and that in order to retain some semblance 
of control in combat, "standard operating 
procedures" would provide the troops with a 
model of response to follow in times of extreme 
stress. Also of interest is his personal emphasis 
upon the importance of orders, his "directives" 
or operational decisions through which he would 
exercise command. He tells his COs he wants 
them to stop and analyze their mission first, do 
a time appreciation, then to formulate a plan to 
execute it thoughtfully and intelligently. He also 
stresses the administrative aspects of his 
commanding officers' responsibilities towards 
their troops and weapons in order to maintain 
his brigade operationally effective. 
Finally, he is concerned with the passage of 
information and maintaining communications 
with his battalions. A cavalryman himself, and 
aware of the importance of timely intelligence and 
constant contact, he reminds his COs that they 
have horses. While he is not thinking of horses 
being useful in trench warfare, he is considering 
them no doubt as a means to speed up face-to-
face contact while out of the line or during 
training. His command philosophy is clear in his 
closing remarks. He wants his battalion 
commanders to be well forward and constantly 
visiting the men, anticipating their needs as well 
as the enemy's intentions and pending events. 
While some of the above may have sounded 
like motherhood to the military man (two of his 
four COs were fellow regular officers, one 
Canadian, one British), Macdonell was 
impressing his personal style of command on his 
subordinates and setting in place his command 
arrangements. He wanted to be perfectly clear 
on how the command process was to work within 
7th CIB so that his "military Machine would run 
smoothly and well." And while the units he would 
"weld" together were undoubtedly "four of the 
finest battalions Canada had sent to the war", 
only one was a veteran battalion while the other 
three had no field experience whatsoever. 
When the decision was made to form the 3rd 
CID towards the end of December 1915, it was 
decided that the new division should be formed 
in France rather than in Canada or the UK. For 
its senior ranking brigade, it absorbed the 
Canadian Corps Troops Infantry Brigade (a two-
day wonder) which was renamed 7th CIB on 22 
December 1915. Macdonell's new command 
comprised the RCR (commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel. A.H. Macdonell, his cousin), the PPCLI 
(Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Buller, DSO), the 42nd 
Battalion, CEF, Royal Highlanders of Canada 
(Lieutenant-Colonel G.S. Cantlie) and the 49th 
Battalion, CEF, Edmonton Regiment (Lieutenant-
Colonel W.A. Griesbach). Of the four battalions, 
only the PPCLI were experienced veterans, having 
come from a year's hard fighting and 
13 
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distinguished service with 
the 80th Brigade in the 27th 
British Division. The RCR. at 
that time the only PF 
battalion, had arrived in 
France in November 1915 
after 11 months garrison 
duty in Bermuda and had 
spent some time with 2nd 
CIB doing work-up training 
followed by a stint of work 
parties. The two remaining 
units, the 42nd and the 49th 
had both arrived in France 
one month earlier in October 
1915, and had been placed 
under the aegis of 1st CID for 
trench warfare training. This 
consisted of no more than 
two 48 hour tours in the 
front line and the same 
period in reserve, followed by 
two months of relentless 
navvy work as unofficial 
pioneer battalions. 10 
With the formation of 7th 
CIB, however, incessant 
labour behind the lines 
would cease and four very 
different infantry battalions 
would find themselves 
together for the duration of 
the war. When the PPCLI 
one moment and cancelled 
the next. We are in a 
constant state of change and 
jump. and so are they. 
nothing runs smoothly and 
none of the staff are sure of 
themselves. Very unlike the 
brigade they took us from 
where every officer had been 
a staff officer for years. I 
should not be surprised if 
they put us into the trenches 
and forget to relieve us. 12 
At that time, it was 
obvious that the Princess 
Patricias were the most 
experienced trench fighters 
in 7th CIB, let alone their 
division. Yet, curiously, there 
is no evidence whatsoever 
that their Brigade and 
Divisional commanders (or 
their respective staffs) 
recognised this fact by 
insisting they share their 
hard-won experience in 
helping train their sister 
battalions in the brigade or 
division. The staffs were too 
busy training themselves. 
Instead, the other infantry 
battalions would have to 
learn by trial and error. 
Macdonell's forward 
joined 7th CIB, they were presence, observation and 
equipped with short Lee- supervisory abilities during 
Enfields and Vickers this time are commented 
machine guns, and, as the Major-General A.C. Macdonell upon repeatedly in his 
former "was universally coveted ... all through the subordinates' memoirs and letters. Lieutenant 
Canadian Corps, wise men of the Regiment did Royal Ewing of the 42nd wrote: "our Brigadier. .. 
not leave their rifles lying about even in billets."11 is a corker- quite an old boy, but very active. He 
But the Regiment not only looked different used to be up in the trenches at all hours of the 
outwardly, internally, it was used to a different day and night." 13 The 42nd War Diary (WD) was 
command system - the standard operating equally effusive: "During two months under the 
procedures of its previous brigade. Major Agar command of Brigadier-General Macdonell he had 
Adamson, the battalion 2 il c was under no made himself respected for his tireless activity 
illusions that they had traded a comfortable, well- and much beloved for his interest in all of us. "14 
understood billet in a veteran, professional Even the highly critical Major Adamson of the 
brigade only to join an "amiture [sic] army." He PPCLI was grudgingly forced to admit, though 
wrote to his wife two weeks after joining 7th CIB: somewhat pompously: "I am quite pleased with 
14 
I think both the division and brigade staffs are 
doing their best but they have had no experience 
and are in a shocking muddle. Orders are issued 
our Brigadier, General MacDonald [sic]. He is 
always on the job and seems to know his job, 
and is most considerate .... He can be depended 
4
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upon to use good judgement and not rush into 
any sudden uncalled for move .... "15 
Whether Brigadier-General Macdonell's near 
fatal encounter with a German sniper illustrated 
good judgement is a matter for debate, but as a 
commander he was adamant that he would be 
well forward in the defence maintaining direct 
personal contact with his subordinates. This 
meant that his staff had to cope in his absence 
and there is some evidence that it struggled 
initially prior to Mt Sorrel. The Brigade Major 
(BM) does not appear to have been as dynamic 
or keen as his commander on the "standing-up" 
of the Brigade, for as Macdonell noted drily in 
his diary on 23 December 1915: "Major Foster, 
Royal Lanes, reported as Brigade Major and left 
at once on leave."lfj Lieutenant Hugh Wallis gives 
us a quick sketch of Foster's background when 
he wrote to his mother on 6 January 1916: 'The 
Brigade Major has now arrived and seems a very 
decent and capable officer. He was at one time 
on the staff of the Lieut. Governor of India and 
was recently on the staff of one of Kitchener's 
divisions. "17 Foster would be wounded before the 
Mt Sorrel battle and temporarily replaced by 
Captain Cecil Critchley, Staff Captain "1", who 
would subsequently be wounded shortly after and 
replaced by Captain Basil Wedd of Toronto from 
HQ 3rd Division. 
If Macdonell had no say in his choice of BM, 
he certainly could handpick the rest of his staff, 
a personal priority on learning he would 
command an infantry brigade. Lieutenant Wallis 
wrote home that "Uncle Archie has asked me to 
go to his Brigade as Orderly Officer, or what it 
amounts to, as A.D.C. to himself." Wallis' initial 
perception of a brigade staff appointment was 
that it meant "a bed to sleep in, comparative 
safety, and many other advantages lucrative and 
otherwise," though this first impression would 
be rudely shattered as the year wore on. On 28 
June 1916, the older and wiser 00 would write: 
"The great objection I have to this place is that I 
get very little sleep whether there is a show on or 
not!" 18 
Captain Critchley, Brigadier-General 
Macdonell's PF adjutant from Lord Strathcona's 
Horse, would come over to fill in as the Staff 
Captain 'T'. That Critchley did not have any 
experience of intelligence work or how an infantry 
brigade operated was insignificant to Macdonell. 
Critchley could learn on the job. Macdonell's 
attitude was one that prevailed throughout the 
BEF with regard to professional intelligence 
work. "It was continually held [pre-1914] that 
the best man to help a commander assess the 
capabilities of enemy infantry was an infantryman 
and the best man to judge the potential threat of 
cavalry was a cavalryman," wrote the British 
Intelligence Corps historian. For an officer to 
devote his career to Intelligence was "in most 
Generals' opinion, a short-sighted policy which 
would lead to an officer having a specialized and 
narrow outlook to problems which required a 
wide and practical background of military 
experience."19 
Lieutenant Wallis, as a former infantry 
battalion Scout Officer, became an indispensable 
assistant to Capt Critchley. "I am going to attach 
myself to Capt [Tom] Rush on the 'Q' side of the 
staff for the next few weeks as far as possible," 
Wallis wrote home, but the arrangement was only 
allowed by Critchley on the condition that Wallis 
"still take a hand in the T side, paying particular 
attention to Sniping, Observation and Maps. "20 
Capt Rush was another Strathcona import, 
having served as Macdonell's regimental QM 
prior to his staff job. Critchley would be 
promoted Major after Sanctuary Wood and would 
act as BM at the Somme battles when Wedd went 
out with pneumonia. 21 
Numerous references in Macdonell's diary 
indicate his preoccupation with finding a good 
Brigade Machine Gun Officer (BGMO), visiting 
no less a personage than Brigadier-General 
Harington at Corps to discuss the matter. 
Eventually his cousin "Archie Angus" Macdonell 
commanding the RCR supplied him with the 
indomitable Captain H.T. Cock, (known in that 
Regiment during and after the war as "Hairy 
Tremendous"), the PF officer who had authored 
the CEF manual on the Colt HMG while serving 
in Bermuda. Lieutenant George Macdonald, 
PPCLI, whom Macdonell claimed as one of his 
own clan and affectionately called "Seorus 
Agraidh" (Red George) in all correspondence, 
became the Brigade Grenade Officer (BGO), and 
later replaced Critchley as Staff Capt "I" when 
the latter was promoted and became BM. 22 
One area in which Macdonell had no initial 
say was in his battalion commanders. "Archie 
Angus," his cousin commanding the RCR, he 
15 
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knew intimately. Griesbach, a former CMR 
trooper in South Africa, was a cavalry officer 
acquaintance, as well as the son of a former 
RNWMP colleague. Lieutenant-Colonel Cantlie of 
the 42nd and Lieutenant-Colonel Buller of the 
49th were respectable officers and gentlemen, but 
both were unknown factors. 
Griesbach was a man after Macdonell's own 
heart. Six days after the latter's return to HQ 7th 
CIB from sick leave in the Spring, the Brigadier 
wrote to the CO of the Edmontonians and, in no 
uncertain terms, assessed his abilities. 
"A Good Commanding Officer makes a Good 
Regiment." Many have not the personality 
necessary at all to command men [underlining 
by Macdonell]. You have and I congratulate you 
on it. I should like to congratulate you also in 
the straight and fearless way in which you have 
reported on the Ross rifle. If only all COs would 
write or speak out as straight (not only about 
the rifle; also about all things concerning their 
commands) smooth working and officering 
would be largely increased. 2 " 
Arriving back from his convalescence in 
hospital, Brigadier-General Macdonell must have 
also taken stock of the new CO of the RCR who 
had replaced his cousin in April when the latter 
left to take command of the 5th CIB. Lieutenant-
Colonel Claude Hill, a PF officer of 15 years 
service prior to the War, came to the brigade with 
18 months experience as Battalion 2 il c of the 
24th Battalion, Victoria Rifles of Canada (VRC), 
in 2nd Division. It was Hill who would earn the 
nickname "The Shino Boys" for the RCR the day 
after he took command when it came out of the 
line in the Salient on 21 April. The regiment was 
greeted with the new CO's orders "that all kit 
must be cleaned and all buttons kept shined 
when the unit was in billets behind the front line. 
Some grumbling resulted; but the Permanent 
Force officers, with a strong belief in the efficacy 
of smartness in enhancing morale, welcomed the 
orders and supported the Commanding Officer's 
stand with a firmness that soon ended all 
opposition. "24 
Whenever Macdonell visited the battalions or 
higher HQs, he always took a staff officer with 
him, usually his nephew Hugh Wallis, and later 
in his tenure, his other nephew, Harold. Hugh's 
brother, Captain Harold Wallis of the 16th 
Battalion, came to 7th CIB in October to replace 
his brother as 00. Hugh Wallis had moved up to 
16 
Staff Captain "I" in September replacing George 
Macdonald who was wounded at the Somme. The 
flexibility of brigade staff officers is shown when 
he wrote his mother: "Capt [P.E.] Coleman has 
been away on leave so I have been looking after 
A&Q while Harold has been on 'T' for me. I am 
OC Rear HQ consisting of the interpreter and 
myself; [the paymaster] is on leave and the 
veterinary officer at division, so I have my hands 
full." Two weeks later he wrote "this short tour 
in charge of A&Q of the Brigade has given me a 
great chance to learn things which I have not had 
an opportunity of doing before. "25 
That Macdonell allowed his fledgling staff 
some latitude within the scope of their 
responsibilities is evidenced by remarks made 
by Wallis during the temporary command of 7th 
CIB by F.O.W. Loomis ( 14 March-5 May), standing 
in for Macdonell while he recovered from his 
wounds. After serving only 12 days under the 
newly-promoted Brigadier-General Loomis, 
Lieutenant Wallis was writing home: "I hope Uncle 
Archie will be back soon; otherwise I shall 
resign; ... F.O.W.L. my old battalion O.C. is in 
command here now." Three weeks later. he was 
more emphatic about Macdonell's return: 
Nothing will please me so much as Uncle Archie's 
return; everyone is just sort of standing by until 
he comes back. I don't seem able to do a thing 
under the present regime although the G.O.C. 
is very decent to me, everyone has difficulty 
carrying on because of his perpetual interfering 
and directing. I often feel like asking to go back 
to the regiment, but must wait and have all the 
information I can, to give to Uncle Archie. 26 
The Loomis "regime" serves to highlight 
Macdonell's personal command style and 
philosophy. Loomis' apparent over-supervision 
trampled the trust and confidence that had been 
slowly building up within the HQ staff as they 
learned their trade, and it is not apparent from 
unit war dairies, regimental histories or letters 
that the stand-in brigadier ever visited the 
forward battalions, thus making his presence felt 
to the troops under his command. Hearing of 
his HQ's malaise via various visitors to his 
convalescent hospital, Macdonell reappeared on 
6 May 1916, before his wounds had truly healed, 
the doughty warrior convinced his clansmen 
needed him. A relapse in the third week sent him 
back for several days, causing Lieutenant -Colonel 
Buller. PPCLI, the senior CO, to move across as 
6
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acting-brigade commander, but at least Loomis 
had moved on to 1st Division. 
The three major engagements of the Canadian 
Corps in 1916- the St. Eloi Craters fiasco, Mount 
Sorrel and the Somme battles - reflected the 
inexperience and the continuing amateur nature 
of the organization. "Deft coordination of all the 
components of the Corps, careful preparation 
prior to battle and skilled use of artillery 
resources that would characterize the Canadian 
performance in 1917 and 1918 were absent," 
notes William F. StewartY Some progress had 
been made towards a more professional and 
efficient force, but too many officers and men still 
had to learn their jobs. Not only was the staff of 
7th CIB raw, its parent formation, 3rd Division 
had only been "stood up" in the winter of 1915-
16 and declared operationally ready as a division 
in March 1916. Even more woefully unprepared 
was the 4th Division which would land in France 
in mid-August 1916, forego the careful 
acclimatization process and contact training 
previously enjoyed by the other three Canadian 
divisions, and be committed to battle the 
following month. Of the three "shows" of 1916, 
7th CIB would find itself deeply involved in the 
latter two actions, the first one defensive, the 
second, offensive. 
The defensive battle, Mount Sorrel, 
"constituted only a small, localized operation of 
little or no significance to the outcome of the war" 
according to historian D.J. Goodspeed, " ... in 
comparison with the monstrous battles of 
Verdun, the Somme and Passchendaele ... "28 In 
the operational scheme of things, it was a German 
spoiling attack against the 3rd Canadian Division 
in the hopes of tying down Allied forces and 
preventing their transfer to Picardy for the 
pending Somme offensive. It can essentially be 
viewed as a fight of three rounds: the Germans 
winning the first two, but the Canadians winning 
the all-important third. Its three phases consisted 
of: the initial German attack on 2 June and the 
uncoordinated, overly hasty and abortive 
Canadian counterattacks on 3 June; the second 
German attack on the afternoon of 6 June; and, 
the successful, deliberate Canadian 
counterattack launched in the early morning of 
13 June by the veteran 1st Division, which forced 
the Germans to relinquish most of their gains. 
The strategic aim of the German operation was 
not achieved and tactically the Germans could 
claim little better than a draw, for the original 
front was established in most of the sector. 29 
For Brigadier-General Macdonell and 7th 
CIB, Mount Sorrel would be their first defensive 
battle as a brigade. "The June Show", as it came 
to be called, occurred at the apex of the Ypres 
Salient, a comparatively flat piece of terrain, 
dominated in the south-easterly portion by a low 
wooded hill known as Mount Sorrel. Practically 
all the ground held by 3rd Division in the forward 
area was still wooded at this stage in the war, its 
frontage of2,500 yards running from the Menin 
Road in the north, south to Mount Sorrel 
inclusive. As a control measure, this in turn was 
divided into two brigade frontages of which 7th 
CIB had responsibility for the left and the 8th 
CIB the right on the day of battle. Each brigade 
defensive scheme called for two battalions in the 
front line, one in support and one in brigade 
reserve. The 7th CIB's two front line battalion 
sub-sectors were known as the Hooge sector on 
the left, the line running through the ruins of the 
village of that name, and the Sanctuary Wood 
sector on the right. Both of these sectors were 
dominated by Mount Sorrel and two other hills 
to their south in the 8th CIB sector. Thus the 
PPCLI History notes: "It was early recognized that 
if the Germans made a determined attempt to 
reach Mount Sorrel, this front line would be 
quickly blown out of existence. The defence 
scheme for Sanctuary Wood and Hooge was 
therefore dependent upon resistance which might 
be provided by the second or R-line.'':Jo 
On the morning of 2 June 1916, German 
artillery fire on the 3rd Division's area developed 
into the heaviest bombardment endured by 
British troops up to that stage in the war. 
Trenches and their garrisons holding them 
vanished in clouds of dirt and dust, while whole 
trees in Sanctuary Wood were hurled skyward 
by the bursting shells. After exploding four large 
mines slightly forward of Mount Sorrel, the 
German infantry overwhelmed the 8th CIB front 
line trenches and captured the important high 
ground as well as Hills 61 and 62 by nightfall. 
The PPCLI, as right forward battalion in the 
Sanctuary Wood sector, was on the northern flank 
of the main German assault. Its right forward 
rifle company was virtually annihilated at the 
outset by artillery fire but its left forward 
company shifted left to help the survivors and 
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together they grimly fought back. Nicholson's 
Official History rightly states: "Credit for 
temporarily checking the enemy's right wing 
belongs to the [forward] Patricias .... As the 
Germans surged eastwards, its rifles volleyed into 
the enemy's right rear. [They were] to hold out 
successfully for eighteen hours, isolated from the 
rest of the battalions and with all their officers 
killed or wounded. ":11 The PPCLI CO was killed 
leading the remnants of his two other rifle 
companies in repeated counterattacks up and 
down the support and communication trenches 
of 8th CIB during the afternoon, buying valuable 
time for the RCR support companies and two 
42nd Battalion rifle companies trying to shore 
up the R-line 500 yards to the rear of the PPCLI. 
Two other 42nd rifle companies were sent over 
the brigade boundary into Maple Copse at the 
rear of 8th CIB's collapsed front line in order to 
prevent the brigade being flanked from that 
direction. 
In essence, the first German success at Mount 
Sorrel had obliterated all brigade boundaries, 
and the most desperate and important fighting 
of 7th CIB- the defence of Warrington Avenue 
and Lover's Walk by the PPCLI on the afternoon 
of 2 June, and the counterattack of the 49th 
18 
Major-General A.C. Macdonell (seated) 
looking out over the Germanfront line. 
February 1918. 
Battalion the next day- took place 
largely on 8th CIB territory. 
The RCR, the left forward battalion 
in the Hooge sector had minimal 
activity on its frontage but soon had 
to turn its right flank towards the 
enemy once the survivors of the 
PPCLI front line companies withdrew 
to the R-Line. Brigadier-General 
Macdonell liaised with the British 
formation on his left flank and 
arranged for British troops to take 
over the RCR's responsibilities 
beyond Hooge so they in turn could 
shift right. HQ 3rd Division was 
fighting its first defensive battle 
without the benefit of a commander. 
Major-General M.S. Mercer had been 
killed by German artillery while on 
reconnaissance in the 8th CIB sector, and the 
latter formation's commander wounded and 
captured. 
Once HQ 3rd Division had confirmed that 
the 8th CIB frontage had been captured, it 
ordered 7th CIB at 1730 hours, 2 June, to restore 
the situation, giving Brigadier -General Macdonell, 
two battalions from its reserve brigade. 9th CIB. 
Corps intervention later revised the initial plan 
and set the time for a coordinated divisional 
counterattack, reinforced by lst Division units. 
for 0200 hours the following day. An immediate 
counterattack by 7th CIB, however, was virtually 
impossible, whoever was ordering it. The 
brigade's reserve battalion, the 49th, which had 
stood to since 1000 hours, 2 June. was far to 
the rear in Ypres and had to come forward 
through smashed-in trenches and an unceasing 
hail of HE, shrapnel and tear gas shells, as did 
the two 9th CIB battalions which were still further 
to the rear. :12 
Brigadier-General Macdonell ordered the 
49th CO to physically coordinate and command 
the attack on the ground forward, but due to 
darkness, confusion wrought by the heavy 
bombardment and lack of communications. the 
8
Canadian Military History, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss4/2
0200 hours "Zero Hour" for the attack was 
repeatedly delayed until 0700 hours the following 
day. The 7th CIB attack did not go in with the 
others on their right flank as two 9th CIB 
battalions failed to show up at the assembly area 
on time. Finally, an exasperated Lieutenant-
Colonel Griesbach ordered the only battalion in 
position, his beloved 49th, to attack alone in 
broad daylight at approximately 0900 hours. 
With virtually no artillery preparation, the 
Edmontonians suffered 358 casualties in the 
space of a few short minutes, achieving nothing.3:1 
The 42nd History described it as a "forlorn hope," 
as no other supporting attacks on the right from 
1st Division accompanied it. thus allowing the 
Germans to concentrate maximum firepower on 
the lone battalion advancing in the open.:l4 The 
49th's losses on 3 June were only surpassed by 
the veteran PPCLI battalion who had suffered 
over 400 casualties, though these were sustained 
over a 24-hour period rather than in a mere 20 
minute timespan. 
With two battalions severely mauled, a CO 
killed and a failed counterattack to its credit, the 
battered 7th CIB was finally relieved on 5 June 
1916. Less than two and half months later they 
would be sufficiently rested and reorganised, 
given some basic assault training, and sent to 
take their turn in the "meat grinder" battles 
further south, known collectively as the Somme. 
During the first of the two major operations 
of 1916, the battle of Mount Sorrel, the picture 
that emerges of Macdonell is of a cool, calm, 
collected commander, working behind the scenes 
to ensure a coordinated effort and trying make 
sure his troops were in the right place at the right 
time with the right resources. In occupying the 
northern half of the Salient he had always been 
concerned about the high ground on his right 
flank to the south where even the most limited 
penetration could bring the enemy into his right 
forward battalion's rear. However, through his 
foresight and planning he had sought permission 
from 8th CIB when they had occupied their sector 
prior to the battle, to position No.3 Company 
PPCLI in that brigade's rear area in case of such 
an eventuality. He and Lieutenant-Colonel Buller 
had readily appreciated that if the enemy were 
to gain Warrington Avenue, a communications 
trench which angled back from the 1st CMR's 
front to his reserve line, his entire brigade 
position would be compromised. 35 
In essence, his brigade "vital ground" 
(ground, which if lost, renders the commander's 
position untenable) was in another brigade's area 
of responsibility. By wisely anticipating the 
enemy's possible actions through a worst 
possible scenario approach, Macdonell ensured 
before the battle ever began that he had balance 
- a better chance of defending his sector than if 
he had slavishly adhered to brigade boundary 
lines on a map. One could readily agree with a 
brigadier commenting in 1917 that "the battle 
'command' is today subordinated to the battle 
'preparation.' Our fights are won or lost before 
we go into them. "36 Though Victor Odium was 
referring to the set-piece assault, his comments 
certainly have some validity for the British trench 
defences of 1916, especially those in the Ypres 
Salient where the enemy was consistently blessed 
with the initiative and dominating ground. How 
the defensive battle was to be fought had to be 
well thought out beforehand and discussed and 
rehearsed from the battalion level of command 
right down to the platoon. Each battalion 
commander was responsible for having his own 
battalion defensive scheme. 
During the 2-3 June battle, command and 
control at the brigade level of front line troops 
was, for all intents and purposes, completely lost 
as all communications were cut by shellfire 
except for the RCR on the extreme left. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Griesbach wrote after the 
battle that he "could not conceive how higher 
command can influence the defence of positions 
without some better means of communication 
than now exist. As it stands, an attack might 
engulfthe whole of the frontline troops, and the 
fugitives' arrival at the Brigade HQ might be the 
first intimation of the fact. ":37 But as most enemy 
assaults were accompanied by a massive barrage, 
defenders usually had more than adequate 
warning. 
When it was obvious the German artillery 
barrage of 2 June was abnormally heavy and not 
abating, Brigadier-General Macdonell had 
ordered the 49th to "stand-to" at 1000 hours and 
be ready to go forward. He did not need orders 
from higher command to understand the 
essentials of his mission. It was a standing order 
to hold the front line at all costs, a task which 
his veteran Patricias, bearing the brunt of the 
attack that day, knew only too well. The 
regiment's steadfast performance and delaying 
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actions gave Macdonell the requisite time to 
shift his forces to consolidate the R-line and to 
move additional troops to the rear of 8th CIB. 
Forward of the R-line, the battle became very 
much a company and battalion commanders' 
"show," local initiatives and common sense 
dictating the defence. 
The only failure in Macdonell's conduct of 
the brigade defensive battle could be said to have 
been the abortive counterattack of the 49th. Once 
the orders were issued for this attack, Macdonell 
had no control over the proceedings, having 
delegated authority for its ultimate conduct and 
launching to Lieutenant-Colonel Griesbach, his 
designated commander on the ground. However, 
like a true commander, he recognized that 
delegation of the task did not necessarily absolve 
him of the responsibility for its failure and that 
he must ultimately share some of the guilt as he 
had delegated a task to a subordinate without 
fully ensuring that subordinate had the requisite 
resources or time to accomplish the task, in this 
instance- adequate artillery fire support and the 
additional manpower of two 9th CIB battalions 
placed under his command for the operation. 
After the battle. Macdonell shielded Lieutenant-
Colonel Griesbach's actions in ordering his sole 
counterattack battalion forward in the doomed 
assault (a decision which must have taken a great 
deal of soul-searching on Griesbach's part, as it 
was his own command) and took full blame for 
all mistakes upon himself in his official report 
to higher HQ stating: 
In reviewing the work done by the 7th Brigade. 
perhaps the proudest thing I can say is 'the 
machine worked smoothly and well." It follows 
that the mistakes- and what military operation 
takes place without them?- were my own. Let 
the splendidly gallant officers and men who 
carried out my orders faithfully unto death and 
held the single line trench at that time was our 
only bulwark against defeat, receive their 
measure of earned praise full to overflowing. "8 
This propensity of Macdonell for downwards 
loyalty secured for him the love and respect of 
his subordinates. One battalion commander told 
Macdonell's biographer, A.E. Kennedy-Carefoot, 
that "in his early army history when he was "on 
the mat" before his superiors, Macdonell [had] 
stood by him splendidly. Such loyalty to one of 
his subordinates was unforgettably appreciated 
by the hapless victim." Griesbach, in an interview 
with Sir Arthur Currie's biographer, Hugh 
20 
Urquhart, after the war, acknowledged that the 
officers and men under Macdonell's command, 
"could only be attacked through him, which is 
alright up to a point, but which has its 
disadvantages. In short, I would say that with 
General Mac it was a religion to stand up for his 
subordinates on every occasion. "~l9 
In retrospect, Brigadier-General Macdonell 
could have told higher HQs before his brigade 
counterattack went in, that their timing for an 
immediate counterattack had long since passed 
and that he had not been allocated nearly enough 
time for what was really the mounting of a 
deliberate counterattack. Currie commanding lst 
Division certainly did, but it did not help. When 
the Corps order was issued at 2045 hours in the 
evening of 2 June several factors dictated that 
the latter form of assault was the type actually 
required: the Germans had already been 
consolidating their gains around Mount Sorrel 
for some six hours; the troops who would have 
to be used for the counterattack were several 
miles from their projected forming-up places and 
would have no time for reconnaissance; artillery 
fire plans would have to be prepared without 
accurate information on the new enemy positions; 
and nothing had been done to silence or 
neutralize the enemy artillery which was still in 
great preponderance around the Salient. 
In short, every basic principle for ensuring a 
successful deliberate counterattack would be 
ignored under the pretence that an immediate 
counterattack was being mounted and these 
oversights could therefore be excused. 
Goodspeed notes that "in light of all this it is 
difficult not to regard Byng's order as an 
emotional rather than a rational reaction. 
Whatever the reasons for the order were. it was, 
as always, the troops who had to pay for the 
mistake. In the event, and not surprisingly, 
almost everything that could go wrong did go 
wrong."40 
Whether Macdonell actually believed the 
ordered counterattack could succeed is not 
recorded, but at least the PPCLI and 49th 
Battalion Histories note his more immediate 
concern as being the PPCLI's precarious state, 
verging on breakdown. "Not to attack," recorded 
the 49th History, "meant leaving the Patricias to 
their fate." The death of the PPCLI's CO, the 
serious wounding of their 2 i/c, and heavy 
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casualties among the senior officers and senior 
NCOs, had left command and control in the 
hands of a few junior officers and NCOs, most of 
whom were also wounded. The PPCLI History 
confirms in a rather convoluted fashion that "the 
Patricias in the line had borne the strain of 
twenty-four hours of constant bombardment and 
fighting superbly; but though they were still 
'perfectly cheerful' they were becoming physically 
and nervously exhausted. "41 
Because Macdonell stood by him, Griesbach 
survived, and his vindication as a good CO was 
reflected in his solid performance in future battles 
and subsequent promotion to Brigadier the 
following year. Griesbach knew whom to thank, 
telling Macdonell in a farewell letter that "Your 
treatment of those under you has had a result 
which you may not have foreseen - your 
Commanders have always been free men- free 
to serve you without fear of anything 
underhanded. Proud to have your commendation 
and too proud to merit your censure." Another 
letter after the war, (Griesbach having served yet 
a second time under Macdonell in 1st Division). 
would be even more frank, stating: "To you I owe 
more than I can say. Friendly and constructive 
criticism, sound advice, generous encouragement 
and appreciation - all these and more I have 
received at your hands. I have not only had justice 
from you but also mercy, and at times, was more 
in need of mercy thanjustice."42 
After Mount Sorrel, the Canadian Corps 
moved to the Somme, that archetypical First 
World War battle which saw long linear waves of 
heavily burdened infantrymen plodding forward 
shoulder to shoulder as Maxims mowed them 
down. It was already a killing ground when the 
Canadians arrived in September, while Macdonell 
was trying to cope with a deep dark depression 
brought on by the news of the death of his only 
son, Ian, a pilot with the Royal Flying Corps. 
Distraught and distracted, he felt he could not 
devote his full and proper attention to the pending 
attack. According to his biographer, he went to 
HQ 3rd Division and had a personal interview 
with Major-General Louis Lipsett. "He asked to 
be excused from the attack." Lipsett expressed 
sympathy but told him it was out of the question 
and that he must command the attack. 43 
Brigadier-General A.C. Macdonell and his son, 
Lieutenant Ian Macdonell, Royal Flying Corps. Ian 
was shot down and killed over German lines during 
the Battle of the Somme. July 1916. 
The 3rd Division, containing 7th CIB, was to 
be employed both in September and October on 
the narrow front bounded on the north by the 
winding Ancre River and on the south by the 
line of the Albert-Bapaume road which bisected 
the town of Courcelette. As the left forward 
division of the Canadian Corps, 3rd Division had 
the role of facing Ancre Heights to the north and 
securing a defensive left flank to the general 
Corps attack being pressed forward astride the 
Albert-Bapaume road. On 15 September, the 
Canadian Corps was ordered to attack on a two 
division frontage, 3rd Division left forward with 
one brigade up (8th CIB) to provide flank 
protection, and 2nd Division right forward to 
attack the forward defences in front of 
Courcelette. The 7th CIB was called up to exploit 
the success of 2nd Division in front of Courcelette 
pushing in between 8th CIB on its left and 5th 
CIB on its right. The 7th CIB secured the Fabeck 
Graben Trench with the 42nd Battalion and the 
PPCLI with minimal trouble and casualties 
thereby securing 5th CIB's left flank as it 
captured Courcelette with relative ease. 44 
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The 7th CIB's luck ran out the very next 
day, however, as German defenders rallied and 
stiffened their defences with a fresh brigade of 
battle-hardened Marines. The RCR and 42nd 
battalions going forward early the next morning 
with little artillery preparation, hoped to exploit 
to the next line of trenches, but suffered heavy 
casualties as a result of their unimaginative effort. 
Taken out of the line to refit. 7th CIB would be 
committed to battle the following month in 3rd 
Division's continuing futile attempts to take the 
infamous Regina trench. This time, the 49th 
Battalion and the still weakened RCR would 
make disastrous unsupported frontal attacks, 
and although the RCR would break into the 
trench system, it would be repulsed by repeated 
counterattacks and sustain over 70 per cent 
casualties. 
The attacks that 7th CIB were called upon 
to mount at the Somme have been termed 
"deliberate" though in fact they were poorly 
coordinated "hasty" attacks. Major-General 
Lipsett himself recognised that Macdonell's men's 
achievements on the 15 September 1916 were 
essentially the combination of good luck and good 
reconnaissance work. He wrote afterwards: 
The problem which faced the commander of the 
7th Brigade was a hard one. Four and a half 
hours only were available to march five miles 
over difficult country devoid of landmarks, 
through enemy barrages, to deploy for attack in 
broad daylight in a captured and partially 
obliterated German trench, the whereabouts of 
which was not known, except from the map. to 
the battalion commanders, and to launch the 
attack. on a two-battalion front at 6 P.M. 
Nevertheless. owing to the previous excellent 
reconnaissance work of the regimental scout 
officers and scouts who had been sent ahead. 
and who met their battalions en route, all 
battalions were in their places on time, and the 
attack went forward punctually.'15 
That luck played a part in the afternoon's 
proceedings is underlined by the following 
revelation in the 42nd's Regimental History: "No 
detailed Battalion operation order was issued 
owing to lack of time and so hurriedly was the 
whole undertaking carried out that it is doubtful 
whether anyone, except the officers and a few of 
the NCOs, had any definite understanding ofthe 
exact task and even these necessarily had but 
slender knowledge of it. "46 The Brigade was 
thus launched and Macdonell's command and 
22 
control capabilities with regards to the 
attacking battalions thus ended. The onus fell 
upon the battalion commanders to carry the 
attack forward. 
Macdonell still retained command and 
control of his support and reserve battalions 
however, units which he could feed into the battle 
as he saw fit and thus still influence the outcome. 
He also controlled the reserve elements of the 
Brigade MG Coy and TM Battery. The battalion 
commanders, to a degree as well, became 
impotent as their assault companies went 
forward from their designated jumping off lines. 
The CO usually stayed back with the reserve 
company and HMGs or in a nearby dugout. The 
Battalion commander's role in battle was to act 
as a sort of advanced report centre for his 
forward companies to report back to so 
information could be relayed back to the 
Brigadier or laterally to flanking units. He too 
could manoeuvre his reserve and HMGs, request 
reinforcements or artillery support, liaise 
laterally with flanking units, or order withdrawals 
or realignments as required. 
Despite 7th CIB's problems on the Somme 
(most not of its own making), the second year of 
the brigade's existence under Macdonell was one 
marked by a higher level of competence and 
professionalism, higher standards of training, 
reorganization of its fighting components at the 
brigade, battalion, company and platoon levels 
and the development of a distinctly Canadian 
attack doctrine. New applications of technology 
and tactics included the massive HMG barrages 
and interdiction introduced on a grand scale at 
Vimy, counter bombardment and sound-ranging 
techniques, counter-electronic warfare, the 
introduction of new gases, aerial photography, 
increased use of wireless, the wide spread use of 
the grid communications system. and fire and 
movement at the platoon and company level. In 
the course of the year, 7th CIB would participate 
in two major operations, Vimy and 
Passchendaele, and a brigade-sized raid 
conducted at Avion in June 1917. After Vimy, 
Macdonell would be earmarked for higher 
command. 
The story of the Canadian Corps' 9-12 April 
assaults on Vimy Ridge is perhaps the most well-
documented in Canadian military history and will 
not be explored in any great detail in this article 
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Top: ''The Shino Boys .. : Non-commissioned officers 
o.f the Royal Canadian Regiment. (NAC PA 3238) 
Above: Vimy Ridge. 191 7. Looking out over the Douai 
Plain and coa{[ields. (DHHJ 
Right: Jocks o.f the 42nd Battalion. Royal 
Highlanders o.f Canada .from Montreal in a .fairly 
pristine-looking trench. (DHHJ 
other than to outline those salient points required 
to provide some historical context for the 
operations of 7th CIB before, during and after 
this seminal battle. Lieutenant-General Byng's 
plan called for a frontal attack by all four divisions 
of the Corps in numerical order from the right to 
left. The 3rd Division, facing La Folie Wood, was 
ordered to attack on a two brigade front. The 8th 
CIB would be on the right and the 7th CIB on 
the left the latter brigade advancing in the 
shadow of Hill 145.47 In 7th CIB, three battalions 
would take part in the assault, each advancing 
with two companies up and two in support ready 
to pass through on the first objective line: the 
RCR right forward; PPCLI centre; and 42nd 
Battalion left forward. The 49th Battalion would 
provide mopping-up and carrying parties for the 
assault battalions.48 
As a whole, the attack of the Corps was to 
be carried out in four stages, each dictated by 
the German zones of defence. On 3rd Division's 
frontage, the operation would only entail 
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participation in the first two stages: an advance 
at 0530 hours, scheduled to reach the first 
objective 35 minutes later. After a 40-minute 
pause to reorganize, a subsequent advance would 
be made at 0645 hours to a line drawn through 
La Folie Wood, along the reverse slope of the 
Ridge and bending back on the left to conform 
with the objectives of 4th Division. The 7th CIB 
was allocated 20 minutes for this second phase. 
The lst and 2nd Divisions had objectives at a 
maximum distance of 4,000 yards from their 
jumping off positions while the 4th Division had 
the shortest distance of all but was faced with 
the prospect of seizing Hill 145, the strongest 
natural defensive position on the whole front. 49 
It should be noted here that, German 
defensive lines and tactics had changed 
significantly everywhere, except on the Ridge 
allocated as the Canadians' objective. After the 
Somme, the German army had gone to a more 
"elastic" defence-in-depth by zones, but on the 
Ridge their dispositions were a hold-over from 
the past, "designed for Falkenhayn's stonewall 
tactics, which proved so disastrous on the 
Somme," notes Byng's biographer, Jeffery 
Williams. "A more elastic system was planned but 
work on it had not begun. In the face of increasing 
destruction caused by the British and Canadian 
guns and frequent alarms caused by infantry 
raids, the garrison could do little more than 
maintain their existing defences."50 
At 0530 hours on the morning of 9 April 191 7 
the rolling barrages opened, and the attacking 
waves of the Canadian divisions went forward. 
Waves, in the case of 7th CIB, however, is not 
quite an accurate description. All of its assault 
battalions had to cross a series of large craters 
to their front before seizing their first objective 
line. It took the 42nd on the left five minutes to 
"scramble across the muddy craters as best they 
could, then re-form with great steadiness just as 
though they were rehearsing over the tapes at 
Bruay."51 
By 0730 hours, all three assault battalions 
were on their final objectives mopping up, but 
the morning was just beginning for the brigade's 
left forward battalion. The 42nd Royal 
Highlanders from Montreal had to re-group in 
the shadow of Hill 145, the highest and most 
important feature of the Ridge. The defences of 
24 
this hill were particularly strong, ringed with 
well-wired trenches and a series of deep dug-
outs on its rear slopes. 
The 42nd got to its final objective line 
initially unhindered because these German 
defences were being heavily shelled. Once the 
Canadian artillery lifted, Hill 145's defenders 
were too preoccupied in bloodily repulsing 11th 
CIB's attempts to seize it. When 11th CIB went 
to ground short of its crucial objective however, 
its defenders had more time to take stock of 
their situation and see that they could enfilade 
7th CIB's position with relative ease in La Folie 
Wood on their left. The majority of the 42nd 
Battalion's casualties sustained at Vimy were 
thus incurred by sniper, MG and observed 
artillery fire being brought to bear from Hill 
145 on their positions in and around their 
consolidated position on the final objective. 52 
The major problem of command and control 
during the battle for Brigadier-General Macdonell 
would therefore be one of liaison over divisional 
boundaries with a flanking brigade. His 
immediate concern was to consolidate his own 
defence and to provide what assistance he could 
the following day for the capture of the 
troublesome hill on his left flank. Two days after 
the capture of Hill 145, lOth CIB would 
successfully storm The Pimple, by which time, 
the enemy accepting the loss of Vi my Ridge as 
permanent, had pulled back two miles to their 
Third line in the new Hindenburg system running 
southeast from Lens across the open plain. 
"The great lesson to be learned from these 
operations," read one divisional after-action 
report, "is this: If the lessons of the war have 
been thoroughly mastered; if the artillery 
preparations and the support are good: if our 
Intelligence is properly appreciated; there is no 
position that cannot be wrested from the enemy 
by well-disciplined, well-trained and well-led 
troops attacking on a sound plan. "5 ~1 After Vimy, 
Brigadier-General Macdonell, in his familiar role 
as keeper of 'The Fighting Seventh's" esprit de 
corps, noted in his congratulatory address to the 
troops that the key factor in their success had 
been time. "Never before, "he rightly stated, "had 
we the chance to work up to an attack in 
detail .... Our training was done with 
thoroughness and proved of incalculable value. "54 
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Comprehensive, progressional and realistic 
unit and formation collective training was backed 
up with an extensive training system featuring 
individual, specialist and reinforcement training 
behind the lines. The move to the Vimy Front 
had been accompanied by the establishment of 
the Canadian Corps Training School [ CCTS] 
under the command of Major A.C. Critchley, 
former BM of 7th CIB. The CCTS was divided 
into an Officers' Wing and an NCO Wing to provide 
instructors for the Divisional Schools. With its 
own training establishment in place, the Corps 
was well on the way to ensuring its own particular 
doctrine was well-disseminated and understood 
by all ranks. But as 7th CIB would learn at Avion 
in early July, the tactics required to take German 
defences at Vimy, based to a large extent on the 
old pre-Somme model, were not necessarily 
applicable to the elastic defence system of 
pillboxes they would encounter at Passchendaele 
or the next year in their assaults to break the 
Hindenburg Line. 
Initially, the Avion Raid was to have been part 
of an limited offensive to "inch up" on the city of 
Lens. Currie, short of supporting guns in early 
June and thus unable to prevent the enemy from 
concentrating overwhelming fire on any 
trenches he might seize, convinced Haig that 
trying to hold captured ground at great cost 
would be unproductive at that time. 
Orders called for six battalions to attack on 
the night of 8/9 June at midnight: three from 
the 11th CIB attacking to the north in the La 
Coulotte sector (out of contact with 7th CIB), and 
three from 7th CIB in the Avion sector with 49th 
Battalion left, 42nd Battalion centre and the RCR 
right. Each battalion of 7th CIB would go in on a 
four-company front, each with three platoons in 
successive waves, the fourth platoons of each 
company staying to constitute the garrison of the 
jumping-off trench. The 7th CIB battalions were 
to attack on approximately 1,200 yards of the 
German front in the Avion area, penetrate into 
enemy lines to a maximum depth of 800 yards, 
hold the ground captured for an hour and a half, 
then begin a covered withdrawal, completing the 
evacuation in a 30 minute timespan. 55 
Preparations for the raid, which would take 
place at night, were conducted with Vimy-like 
thoroughness behind the lines. Rehearsals were 
conducted by day and night over taped ground 
and troops instructed to memorize the exact 
locations of all known enemy MG posts, trench 
mortar posts, and dugouts. The composition and 
duties of trench raiding parties received 
particular attention. 56 
In the aftermath of the raid, the newly-
promoted Major-General Macdonell, of course, 
regarded it as a huge success. "Batty Mac" wrote 
Major-General A.C. Macdonell with his staff, 1st Canadian Division HQ. 
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to a subordinate officer two days later: "The 
Brigade put on a good show the other night 
and we are beginning to consider that we are 
'Sturm Truppen' for fair. It was a good 'Show,' 
well carried out and successful in every 
respect. "57 By contrast. the view from the ranks 
was considerably different, especially in the 
49th Battalion which sustained the highest 
casualties going in on the left flank of the raid. 
From Sergeant A. Fowlie's perspective, whose 
platoon was virtually wiped out, "it was a very 
fierce affair and it lacked the luck. We held the 
trench and the Germans infiltrated my 
company ... .I lost three very good friends of mine 
in that raid. I don't think it was a very good 
planned affair after all. "58 On withdrawing after 
two hours in the enemy's trenches, the three 
battalions forsook the cover of the German 
trenches to move back across no-man's-land 
and were caught in a heavy German counter-
bombardment. In the words of Lieutenant G.D. 
Kinnaird, 49th Battalion, who was severely 
wounded, "the moppers-up were mopped up. "59 
The 42nd Battalion History deemed the raid 
to be "the most thoroughly organized and 
brilliantly carried out minor operation in which 
the Brigade ever participated as a unit." As a 
battalion, the 42nd went in with its flanks secured 
by the other two battalions, though it had the 
second highest rate of casualties. It went on to 
claim, somewhat correctly, that the raid was out 
of the ordinary in that "it was carried out on a 
very much larger scale than had ever been 
attempted" with the added difficulty of having 
been conducted at night. However, ex-Corporal 
Will Bird of the 42nd Battalion scathingly defused 
much of the credibility of this particular 
regimental history when he wrote in 1933, "the 
latter is a very finely-bound book and only lacks 
a slight insertion at the beginning "For Officers 
Only."6o 
The 7th CIB reported that it had sustained 
335 casualties in the raid, 38 of them fatal, but a 
quick tally of the battalion counts show the actual 
killed total to have been 44 all ranks. 61 Quick to 
justify the raid in terms of its value, 7th CIB 
claimed an inordinately high body count of 560 
enemy killed, an entire battalion's worth. This 
figure is not realistic as the Germans only 
manned a regimental sector with one battalion 
in the first two lines of trenches and many of the 
frontline and second line defenders retreated to 
26 
their third line during the attack. Many of the 
dugouts destroyed by the 7th CIB raiding force 
would thus have been empty. The 49th 
Regimental historian asks a valid question and 
leaves the answer unstated, but obvious: "Did 
this operation yield a credit balance? .. .In the 49th 
records one account declares that the attack went 
in perfect alignment; another, that it was all 
confusion .... The menace of the counter-barrage 
perhaps had been over-discounted. In the 
darkness the man who sits tight with his weapon 
is certain to enjoy an advantage over his 
adversary who stumbles across open ground to 
seek and destroy him. "62 
The planning and training for the A vi on Raid 
was Batty Mac's last "show" as brigade 
commander, the actual raid taking place after he 
had left to take up command of 1st Division. At 
home in Canada, his promotion to Major-General 
had been questioned by Borden who tried to 
block it on the instigation of Major-General Sam 
Steele, the latter feeling that the command should 
go to Sam Hughes' son, Garnet. The new corps 
commander adamantly refused to have Hughes 
in lieu of Batty Mac. George Perley. the Minister 
responsible for Canada's military forces overseas 
supported Currie's decision and told the prime 
minister bluntly that Hughes was not wanted at 
the front. Major-General Steele was sent home 
for his indiscretion in circumventing Perley and 
going straight to Borden. 6~l 
The stories of Batty Mac as GOC of the "Old 
Red Patch" are told elsewhere. After the war he 
served as the Commandant of the Royal Military 
College from 1919 to 1925, his first tenure of 
office followed by an unprecedented second 
including a one year extension. He would also 
serve as the Honorary Colonel of four different 
regiments: Lord Strathcona's Horse (RC). The 
British Columbia Horse, The Stormont, Dundas, 
and Glengarry Highlanders, and the Queen's Own 
Cameron Highlanders of Canada. 
But it was on taking leave of the Fighting 
Seventh that the flamboyant and, normally, 
garrulous commander found himself, for the first 
time in his career, at a loss for words. The 
brigade, out of the line after the Avian Raid, 
formed in hollow square on a sunny June day to 
say goodbye to him and his "unconventional but 
always vivid behaviour, his foolhardiness and his 
gift of terse exposition. "64 The 42nd regimental 
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padre leaves the best account and summary 
of "Batty Mac" as brigade commander: 
Not many of us will forget that day at Chateau 
de Ia Haie when our Brigadier - afterwards 
Major-General Sir Archibald Cameron 
Macdonell. K.C.B., C.M.G.,D.S.O. - bade us 
farewell as he went to assume command of the 
First Division. In silence we waited for his 
coming, in silence we listened for the words that 
somehow would not come. and then as he put 
his horse to the gallop and left us, the Brigade 
burst into cheers. and there was more love, more 
honour in those cheers than words could have 
ever told. Thus the 7th Canadian Inf. Brigade 
said goodbye to him who had lived with us and 
for us. alternately raged upon us and praised 
us, and in all things led us through fair and foul 
for over eighteen months. It is not sentiment, 
but simple fact. to say that he was loved and 
honoured- the grey old chieftain of the clans, a 
bonny fighter and a born leader. 65 
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